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REFORMING THE LAWS AND PRACTICE 
OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 
By custom and long-standing federal statute, diplomatic agents 
of foreign nations sent to the United States have been accorded lib-
eral immunities from local civil and criminal jurisdiction. 1 Until re-
cently, approximately 19,000 persons, including family members, 
were entitled to such diplomatic immunity in Washington, D.C. 
alone. 2 The privilege of diplomatic immunity has sometimes been 
abused. Traffic accidents resulting in uncompensated property 
damage and personal injuries, unpaid parking tickets, and ignored 
contracts obligations are several of the types of abuses spawned by 
this immunity. 3 
As a result of public criticism and increasingly strained reiations 
between diplomatic communities and local communities, Congress 
recently enacted legislation that dramatically changes United 
States diplomatic immunity law. 4 This legislation eliminates the 
complete immunity from criminal and civil law proceedings that 
was afforded most foreign diplomats and their staffs, and estab-
lishes the rules of the Vienna Convention on Diplomati~ Relations5 
as the measure of diplomatic immunity in the United States. 6 This 
article will examine the theoretical justification for diplomatic im-
munity and its application in the United States. The manner in 
1 Diplomatic agents have been generally immune from arrest or imprisonment and exempt 
from criminal and civil suit in the host country. C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 563 (4th 
ed. 1965). Under former United States law, any judicial process initiated against a foreign 
diplomat was deemed null and void. 22 U.S.C. § 252 (1976)(repealed 1978). See notes 19-22 
and accompanying text infra. 
2 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities: Hearings and Markup Before the Subcommittee 
on International Operations of the Committee on International Relations of the House of 
Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 64-65 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Diplomatic 
Privileges and Immunities Hearings] (letter from Douglas J. Bennett, Jr., Assistant Secre-
tary for Congressional Relations to the Hon. Joseph L. Fisher, Chairman, Subcommittee on 
International Operations). Additionally, there are concentrations of diplomatic personnel in 
other United States cities, particularly in New York. 
3 See, e.g.,.Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 48; NEWS-
WEEK, Aug. 8, 1977, at 42; Detroit Free Press, Jan. 18, 1978, at IA, col. 3. It is clear that past 
diplomatic immunity laws shielded diplomatic personnel from the consequences of acts 
which would result in arrest, trial, and punishment if committed by Americans. 
4 H.R. 7819, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 7877 (1977) passed the House of Rep-
resentatives July 27, 1977. An amended version of H.R. 7819 passed the Senate August 17, 
1978. 124 CONG. REc. 13695 (1978). The Senate amendments were agreed to by the House. 
124 CONG. REc. 10004 (1978). The President approved the legislation Sept. 30, 1978. This 
act, The Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (1978), is dis-
cussed at pp. 100-10 infra. 
5 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. See text accompanying notes 42-63 infra. 
6 Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 3, 92 Stat. 808 (1978). 
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which the recently enacted legislation alters United States dip-
lomatic immunity law, as well as the reasoning and possible impact 
of such law reform, also will be discussed. 
I. RATIONALE FOR DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 
The concept of diplomatic immunity is one of the oldest and 
most universally recognized principles of international law and is 
embodied in international custom, practice, and agreements. 7 Al-
though its application in practice varies among nations, diplomatic 
immunity may be defined broadly as "the freedom from local juris-
diction accorded under international law by the receiving state to 
duly accredited diplomatic officers, their families and servants. " 8 
Until recently, the United States has granted complete immunity to 
all foreign nationals in the employ of an embassy who are not per-
manent residents and are assigned the proper nonimmigrant visa 
status. By special statutes, diplomatic immunity is enjoyed by the 
permanent representatives of country missions to the United Na-
tions and the Organization of American States as well as by the top 
officials of the United Nations. 9 
Diplomatic officers are generally accorded certain privileges 
with respect to such matters as exemptions from customs duties 
and local taxation. Although often associated with diplomatic im-
munity, such privileges are not embraced in thatterm and are not 
discussed in this note. 1 0 
Three theories commonly have been proposed to justify the his-
torical practice of according diplomats certain immunities. 11 The 
theory of personal representation considers the dipJomatic envoy 
to be the personification of the state he represents. Because the 
7 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW§ 400 (1942); M. OGDON, JURlDI-
CAL BASES OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 2 (1936); H. RIEFF', DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR 
PRIVILEGES, IMMUNITIES AND PRACTICE- 6 (1954); Barnes, Diplomatic Immunity From 
Local Jurisdiction: Its Historical Development Under International Law and Application in 
United States Practice, 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 173 (1%0); Preuss, Capacity for Legation 
and the Theoretical Basis of Diplomatic Immunities, 10 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 170 (1932-33). 
8 Barnes, Diplomatic Immunity From Local Jurisdiction: Its Historical Development 
Under International Law and Application in United States Practice, 43 DEP'T STATE BULL. 
173 (1%0). 
9 See Convention on Privileges and lmmuniiies of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 21 
U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900; 22 V.S.C. § 288 (g) (1976) (provision extending certain im-
munities to representatives of member states of the Council of the Organization of American 
States). 
10 See 26 U.S.C. § 893 (1976) regarding exemption from federal income tax for alien em-
ployees of foreign governments. For postal privileges, see 39 U.S.C. § 4168 (1976). United 
States customs regulations provide for the extension of custom courtesies and free entry 
privileges to foreign diplomatic personnel, if reciprocal privileges are granted by the foreign 
government to United States personnel of comparable status. See 19 C.F.R. §§ 148.86-.90 
(1977). 
11 See M. OGDON, supra note 7, at 63-94, 105-65, 166-94. 
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representative is endowed with the sovereignty of the state, he is 
given special immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of the re-
ceiving state. 12 The theory of exterritorality explains immunity by 
considering the diplomat to be on the soil of his native country. 
Thus, the diplomatic agent is said not to be subject to local law be-
cause, within the contemplation of law, he is not present in the host 
country .13 
Rather than relying on the legal fictions of these two theories, the 
modem justification for diplomatic immunity is grounded in the 
theory of functional necessity .14 This theory suggests that dip-
lomats must be granted a privileged status affording freedom of 
movement and communication if they are to fulfill their functions 
in foreign states and thereby facilitate relations between nations. 15 
The effective performance of diplomatic functions is only possible 
if diplomatic representatives are uninhibited by harassment or in-
timidation.16 
The theory of functional necessity is more pragmatic and realis-
tic than the other theories justifying diplomatic immunity, 1 7 yet it 
does present some difficulties. Grants of immunity under the func-
tional necessity theory can be justified only if the exercise of par-
ticular diplomatic functions requires the extension of such immun-
ity. Consequently, it is necessary to identify both the functions es-
sential to the accepted practice of diplomacy and the degree of im-
munity necessary to facilitate the performance of those func-
tions.18 
12 This legal fiction is recognized in Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 
1946) where the court observed inter alia that "a foreign minister is immune from the juris-
diction, both criminal and civil, of the courts in the country to which he is accredited, on the 
ground that he is the representative, the alter ego, of his sovereign who is, of course, entitled 
to such immunity." Id. at 341. 
13 See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898); Wilson v. Blanco, 56 N.Y. 
Super. Ct. 582, 4 N. Y.S. 714 (1889). 
14 See C. WILSON, DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 20 (1967). 
15 This view is expressed in the frequently quoted letter from Secretary of State Elihu 
Root to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, March 16, 1906: 
The reason of the immunity of diplomatic agents is clear, namely: that Govern-
ments may not be hampered in their foreign relations by the arrest or forcible pre-
vention of the exercise of a duty in the person of a governmental agent or represen-
tative .... It likewise follows from the necessity of the case, that the diplomatic 
agent must have full access to the accrediting state, else he cannot enter upon the 
performance of his specific duty, and it is equally clear that he must be permitted to 
return to the home country in the fulfillment of official duty. 
4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW§ 400, at 513 (1942). 
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 73, 
Comment at 229-30 (1965). 
17 The theory of functional necessity finds support in the case law. See Hellenic Lines, 
Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States ex rel. Casanova v. Fitzpatrick, 
214 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
18 C. WILSON, supra note 14, at 22. 
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II. AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY LAW 
PRIOR TO THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT OF 1978 
A. The 1790 Statute 
In 1790, the United States enacted laws19 which were declara-
tory of international law and designed to give the principle of dip-
lomatic immunity local application. 20 The 1790 statute effectively 
guaranteed diplomatic agents freedom from the civil and criminal 
jurisdiction of the United States or any state. Foreign diplomatic 
personnel accredited to the United States government were im-
mune from arrest or imprisonment and their property could not be 
seized or attached. Any writ or process issued against such persons 
was null and void. 2 1 Persons who obtained or executed a writ or 
process against diplomatic personnel were subject to fines and up 
to three years imprisonment. 22 
The courts broadly construed the immunity provision. The im-
munity which it provided was not confined to those actions which 
had as a direct objective the seizure or attachment of goods or chat-
tels. 23 Moreover, this statute had been interpreted to provide abso-
lute immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction not only for the 
diplomatic agent but also for members of his immediate family and 
members of the diplomat's administrative, technical, and service 
staff.24 This immunity also extended by statute to private servants 
in the household of the diplomat, provided they were foreign na-
tionals with proper visa status.25 American citizens registered with 
the Department of State who were in the service of foreign dip-
lomatic missions were also exempt from judicial process, except 
for suits arising out of debts contracted before they entered upon 
such service. 26 
19 22 U .S.C. §§ 252-54 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
20 United States v. Melekh, 190 F. Supp. 67 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
21 22 U .S.C. § 252 (1976) (repealed 1978). This section was derived from an act of Parlia-
ment passed in 1708, 7 Anne, c. 12 (1708), when diplomatic relations between Great Britain 
and Russia were jeopardized by the arrest for debt of the Russian Ambassador to London. 
Trost v. Tompkins, 44 A.2d 226, 228 (1945). 
22 22 U.S.C. § 253 (1976) (repealed 1978). In Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 
(D.C. Cir. 1965), the court held that a United States Marshall was justified in refusing to 
serve a summons on a Tunisian Ambassador because the ambassador's diplomatic immunity 
would be violated by the service of process. The court stated: ••For although courts will not 
allow a marshal! to avoid his duty to serve process merely because he notices the availability 
of a defense to the suit, they must protect him if service would violate international law and 
might subject him to the criminal law of the United States." Id. at 979. 
23 Bergman v. De Sieyes, 71 F. Supp. 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1946). 
24 Herman v. Apetz, 130 Misc. 618,224 N.Y.S. 389 (1927); Carbone v. Carbone, 123 Misc. 
656, 206 N.Y.S. 40 (1924). 
25 22 U.S.C. § 254 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
2
• 22 U.S.C. § 254 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
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Under the 1790 statute, diplomatic agents, however, were not to-
tally exempt from the restraints of United States law. By initiating 
a law suit, an individual entitled to diplomatic immunity effectively 
waived his immunity and subjected himself to counterclaims di-
rectly connected with the original claim. 27 The waiver of immunity 
arising as a result of suit, however, did not constitute a waiver of 
immunity from execution of resulting judgments. 28 Diplomatic im-
munity also could be waived by the embassy or foreign government 
involved.29 However, even when such immunity had been waived, 
there was a reluctance to sue because anyone who wrongfully sued 
or criminally prosecuted a diplomat could be fined or sent to jail. 30 
Diplomats immune from judicial process, however, were still 
subject to extra-judicial sanctions. A formal complaint could be 
submitted to the offending diplomat's government, or an official 
request made for his recall. Alternatively, the federal government 
could declare him persona non grata and order the offender to 
leave the country .31 These sanctions were sparingly employed, 
however, and were reserved for the most outrageous cir-
cumstances.32 Moreover, removal of foreign officials did not com-
pensate residents of the United States who may have been seri-
ously injured by the unlawful or negligent actions of the offending 
diplomatic official. The Department of State often intervened and, 
in appropriate cases, attempted to bring disputes to the attention of 
the diplomat's embassy with a request that it promote a just settle-
ment.33 However, a number of United States citizens have been 
unable to obtain compensation or satisfactory resolution of dis-
putes despite the efforts of the Department of State. 34 
In providing broad protection for all diplomatic personnel, the 
1790 statute was designed to meet the conditions of diplomacy in 
the eighteenth century. At that time, there were only small num-
bers of diplomats in this country and most were directly engaged in 
actual diplomatic functions with the United States. Given the 
greatly expanded staffs of current diplomatic missions, the exten-
sive immunity granted in 1790 is not justified, since many such per-
sonnel do not perform diplomatic functions and the immunity is 
27 RESfATEMENT (SECOND), -FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES§ 79, at 
248 (1965). 
28 Id. Cf. Herman v. Apetz, 130 Misc. 618,224 N.Y.S. 389 (1927). 
29 Id. See also United States v. Butenko, 384 F.2d 554 (3rd Cir. 1967), vacated on other 
grounds sub nom. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1968); United States v. Arizti, 
229 F. Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
30 See 22 U.S.C. § 253 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
31 Barnes, supra note 8, at 1n. 
32 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 217. 
33 Id. at 216. 
34 See note 3 supra. 
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subject to abuse. Accordingly, a systematic reduction of diplomat-
ic immunity would not interfere with diplomatic efforts, would re-
duce abuse of the immunity, and is consistent with the functional 
necessity theory, which has been adopted by most other coun-
tries. 35 
B. Abuses of Diplomatic Immunity 
Through diplomatic immunity, governments ensure that dip-
1omatic personnel can carry out their legitimate functions. How-
ever, the benefits of improved international relations derived from 
these grants of immunity must be balanced against the obligation of 
the receiving government to protect the interests of its citizens. Al-
though most members of the diplomatic community are respectful 
of United States laws and regulations, abuses of diplomatic immun-
ity result in needless personal hardship to innocent American citi-
zens and strained relations with local governments. As a result of 
these abuses, the media coverage and local opinion, particularly in 
New York and Washington, D.C., have become increasingly criti-
cal of diplomatic immunity.36 
Some of the most frequent problems raised in connection with 
diplomatic immunity involved disobedience of local laws and regu-
lations, particularly those relating to the use of-automobiles. For 
example, in New York City alone diplomats are respo]!_sible for 
over 200,000 parking tickets annually. Only one percent of the 
parking tickets are ever paid, so that the city loses approximately 
five million dollars a year. 37 In the District of Columbia diplomatic 
personnel were accountable for 37,905 unpaid parking tickets be-
tween January 1, 1976 and March 31, 1977. This represents 
$1,070,000 in fines and penalties.38 
Unsatisfied tort claims, primarily those resulting from auto-
mobile accidents, result in the denial of compensation to injured 
United States citizens. 39 Disputes arising out of contracts, includ-
ing broken apartment leases, bad checks, unhonored personal con-
tracts, and other similar transactions present similar problems of 
35 Over one hundred nations have signed the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, which provides a narrower grant of dip-
lomatic immunity than does the 1790 statute. See notes 42-63 and accompanying text infra. 
38 NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1977, at 42. 
37 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 48-49. 
38 ld. at 49. 
39 See NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1977, at 42. In April 1974 a George Washington University 
professor was injured by a cultural attache of the Panamanian Embassy in an automobile 
accident. The former professor is now a quadriplegic and will require full-time nursing for 
the remainder of her life. The Panamanian was not insured and suit could not be brought 
because of the official's diplomatic immunity. 
FALL 1978] Diplomatic Relations Act 97 
innocent parties unfairly suffering financial loss.40 The Department 
of State has been notified less frequently of claims made by United 
States citizens against diplomatic personnel involving divorce and 
non-support, disorderly conduct, and theft. 4 1 
While relatively few people or communities are adversely af-
fected by claims of diplomatic immunity, these abuses emphasized 
the need for the United States to bring its laws into conformity with 
generally accepted international practice as codified in the Vienna 
Convention. 
Ill. VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 
Although United States law formerly extended full diplomatic 
immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction to all foreign nation-
als employed by a foreign embassy, many nations long ago cur-
tailed their grant of a similar blanket immunity. Well over one 
hundred of these nations are signatories of the Vienna Convention 
on Diplomatic Relations,42 a comprehensive international codifica-
tion of the immunities extended to members of permanent diplomat-
ic missions and their families. 43 The Vienna Convention adopts 
the functional approach to diplomatic immunity in that it accords 
varying degrees of immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction to 
various categories of embassy functionaries and their family mem-
bers. 44 The Vienna Convention confers immunity only where 
necessary to ensure that the diplomatic personnel of foreign gov-
ernments can carry out their functions free of unreasonable re-
straints imposed by local authorities. Under a functional necessity 
analysis, blanket immunity for diplomatic agents, their families, 
40 See Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 48. For example, 
the wife of the late dean of the White House Press Corps rented a home to a legal attache at 
the French Embassy. She alleged that the diplomat caused $11,000 worth of damage to the 
house, but she could not collect because of diplomatic immunity. 
A New York landlord sold a four story building to the Congo as headquarters for the Afri-
can nation's mission to the United Nations. The Congolese refused to make the quarterly 
payments on their $400,000 mortgage. The landlord attempted to foreclose on the Congolese 
and have them evicted, but they claimed that diplomatic immunity prohibited their eviction. 
See Detroit Free Press, Jan. 18, 1978, at IA, col. 3. 
41 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 214-15. 
42 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. 
43 In drafting its provisions, the Convention examined the entire body of law and practice 
of diplomatic intercourse and immunities since 1815. International Law Commission Report, 
13 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 9) 11-27, U.N. Doc. N3859 (1958), reprinted in 53 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 230, 253-91 (1959). 
44 The Convention "does at least formulate rules relating to status, privilege and im-
munities with consistent regard to what is reasonable and necessary between sovereign 
states." Simmonds, The Rationale of Diplomatic Immunity, II INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1204, 
1210 (1962). 
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employees, and domestic servants cannot be justified as it was 
under earlier practice and theory. 
The Vienna Convention differs in several respects from the re-
pealed statutory law of the United States. Under the 1790 statute, 
diplomatic agents duly accredited to the United States, and mem-
bers of their immediate families residing with them, and members 
of the diplomat's administrative, technical, and service staff were 
accorded full civil and criminal immunity from the jurisdiction of 
the United States.45 Under the Vienna Convention, diplomatic 
agents46 and their families, 47 and most members of the embassy 
staff are fully exempt from criminal jurisdiction, but immunity from 
civil process is limited to reflect the functional requirements of dif-
ferent positions.48 This reduction of the traditionally extensive dip-
lomatic immunity can be attributed to the increasing acceptance of 
the functional necessity theory, which is recognized in the Vienna 
Convention. The Convention's preamble states that the purpose of 
diplomatic privileges and immunities is "to ensure the efficient per-
formance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing 
states.' '49 
The Vienna Convention gives diplomats and their immediate 
families full immunity from criminal and civil prosecution.50 Ad-
ministrative and technical staff51 of an embassy have full immunity 
from criminal jurisdiction, but are exempted from civil process 
only for their official acts. 52 The families of such staff members are 
immune from criminal prosecution but are not granted any civil 
immunity. 53 Members of the service staff54 are granted civil and 
45 Herman v. Apetz, 130 Misc. 618, 224 N .Y.S. 389 (1927); Carbone v. Carbone, 123 Misc. 
656,206 N.Y.S. 40 (1924). See text accompanying notes 24-26supra. 
46 A "diplomatic agent" is defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 
Apr. 18, 1961, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3231, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, as the head of the diplomatic 
mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the mission. 
47 The Convention provides complete civil and criminal immunity for members of the fam-
ily of the diplomatic agent forming part of his household. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 37, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3244, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. 
48 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 
3240, T.I.A.S. No. 7502; art. 37, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3244, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. 
A review of the debate and consideration cr amendments to the Vienna Convention indi-
cates that there was support for significant limitations on diplomatic immunity. See Kerley, 
Some Aspects of the Vienna Conference on Diplomatic Intercourse Immunities, 56 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 88 (1962). 
49 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3230, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. 
50 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 
3240, T.I.A.S. No. 7502; art. 37, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3244, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. 
51 The administrative and technical staff includes archivists, clerks, secretaries, stenog-
raphers, messengers, and interpreters. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 
18, 1961, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3230, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. 
52 See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 37, 23 U .S.T. 3227, 
3244; T.I.A.S. No. 7502. 
53 Id. These family members were fully subject to criminal and civil jurisdiction under the 
1790 statute. 22 U.S.C. §§ 252, 254 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
54 The Convention defines members of the service staff as those in the domestic service of 
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criminal immunity only for their official acts, 55 and their families 
are fully subject to the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the receiv-
ing state. 56 Private servants57 of diplomatic agents are not ac-
corded any immunity .58 
The United States signed the Vienna Convention in 1961, and it 
entered into force with respect to the United States in 1972. 59 Since 
the Vienna Convention is self-executing, no legislation is needed to 
implement the treaty. By virtue of the supremacy clause of the Unit-
ed States Constitution, treaties confirmed by the Senate, along 
with the Constitution and acts of Congress made pursuant thereto, 
are "the supreme law of the land."60 Generally, when there is a 
conflict between a treaty and an act of Congress the last expression 
of the sovereign will controls. 61 However, despite the fact that 
immunity standards set forth in the treaty are more restrictive than 
those incorporated in the 1790 statute, the statute continued to 
govern the availability of diplomatic immunity where the Conven-
tion did not apply. This result was consistent with the Convention, 
for article 47 clearly states that a broader conferral of immunity 
may be granted by the receiving state despite the narrower scope of 
immunity provided in the Convention. 62 Both the Department of 
Justice and the Department of State indicated that the Vienna Con-
vention, while it became the law of the land, did not impliedly re-
the mission. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. 
3227, 3230, T.l.A.S. No. 7502. 
55 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 37, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 
3244, T.l.A.S. No. 7502. 
56 Id. Families of service staff were not accorded any immunity under the 1790 statute. 22 
U.S.C. §§ 252, 254 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
57 The Convention defines a private servant as a person who is in the domestic service of a 
member of a mission and who is not an employee of the sending state. Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 1, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3230, T.l.A.S. No. 7502. 
58 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 37, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 
3244, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. Such servants were entitled to full criminal and civil immunity re-
gardless of their nationality under the 1790 statute. 22 U .S.C. §§ 252, 254 (1976) (repealed 
1978). 
59 The Convention was signed on behalf of the United States June 29, 1961 and ratified by 
the U.S. Senate on November 8, 1972. Ratification was deposited with the United Nations 
Secretary General on November 13, 1972 and the Convention entered into force with re-
spect to the United States on December 13, 1972. See H.R. REP. No. 526, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 2 (1977); S. REP. No. 958, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978). 
60 U.S. CON~. art. VI, § 2. 
61 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
62 Article 47 disallows discrimination between states in the application of the Convention, 
but it does make allowance for reciprocity and finds no illegitimate discrimination 
where the receiving State applies any of the provisions of the present Convention 
restrictively because of a restrictive application of that provision to its mission in 
the sending State; [or] ... where by custom or agreement States extend to each 
other more favourable treatment than is required by the provisions of the present 
Convention. 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 47, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3249, 
T.I.A.S. No. 7502. 
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peal the 1790 domestic law of immunity. 63 Consequently, the 
sweeping diplomatic immunity provided by the 1790 statute con-
tinued to be effective. Repeal of the 1790 statute was necessary to 
allow the United States to apply the immunity provisions of the 
Vienna Convention and bring United States law into line with those 
of other countries. 
IV. THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT 
The Diplomatic Relations Act (DRA) of 1978 was signed into law 
on September 30, 1978, 64 repealing the 1790 statute and leaving the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as the sole basis for 
diplomatic immunity in the United States. 65 It also establishes a 
mandatory liability insurance requirement for all embassy person-
nel and their families who operate motor vehicles, vessels, or air-
craft in the United States. 66 The President is granted discretion to 
extend, on a reciprocal basis, more favorable or less favorable 
treatment to diplomatic personnel than the Convention specifies. 67 
The Act also provides a mechanism for dismissal of actions by a 
judicial tribunal where immunity is found to exist, 68 and grants fed-
eral district courts jurisdiction of civil actions against diplomatic 
personnel. 69 
A. Repeal of the 1790 Statute 
The DRA ends the broad immunity extending beyond that 
granted by the Vienna Convention and brings our domestic law 
into conformity with the law of the other nations that have signed 
the Convention. Additionally, the Act stipulates that the Conven-
tion shall apply to the representatives of all nations irrespective of 
whether a nation has ratified it, thus providing uniform treatment 
for all members of the diplomatic community. 70 
63 The Department of Justice memorandum was published in [1973) DIGEsr OF UNITED 
STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 143, and the State Department ruling was pub-
lished in [1975) DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 242. 
64 See note 4 supra. 
85 Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 3, 92 Stat. 808 (1978). See notes 
70-76 and accompanying text infra. 
66 Id.·§ 6. See notes 77-103 and accompanying text infra. 
67 Id. § 4. See notes 104-09 and accompanying text infra. 
68 Id. § 5. See notes 110-15 and accompanying text infra. 
69 Id. § 8. See notes 116-23 and accompanying text infra. 
70 Id. § 3. 
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The ORA extends the diplomatic immunity provided by the 
Convention to all embassy and mi'ssion personnel in the United 
States, and to all United Nations personnel in New York, as well as 
to their families. 71 By fully embracing the Convention, the Con-
gress has effectively adopted the functional analysis and reduced 
the blanket immunity which many diplomats enjoyed and some 
abused. 72 Senior diplomatic personnel retain their comprehensive 
immunity, while lower level personnel retain their immunity only 
while they are engaged in official embassy business. Arguably, the 
remaining immunity is necessary to the exercise of the diplomatic 
function and to the protection of the channels of diplqmatic inter-
course. 
Repeal of the 1790 statute remedies the overwhelming majority 
of problems which Americans have encountered in their relations 
with members of the diplomatic community. The ORA terminates 
civil immunity for many lower echelon officials and their families. 
In Washington, O.C., for example, there were approximately 6,000 
embassy personnel, excluding family members, who were immune 
from civil action. Under the Act, approximately 4,000 of these offi-
cials are subject to normal civil suit for their unofficial acts. 73 Thus, 
this measure is a significant step in providing legal relief for United 
States citizens involved in civil disputes with embassy personnel. 
Although the ORA allows diplomatic agents, administrative and 
technical staff, and their families full immunity from the criminal 
jurisdiction of the United States, members of the service staff only 
have immunity from the criminal jurisdiction for their official acts, 
and private servants no longer have any criminal immunity. 74 
71 The ORA defines mission as follows: "The term mission includes missions within the 
meaning of the Vienna Convention and any missions representing foreign governments, in-
dividually or collectively, which are extended the same privileges and immunities, pursuant 
to law, as are enjoyed by missions under the Vienna Convention .... " Id. § 2. 
This expansive concept of mission includes any permanent or special diplomatic mission 
accredited or recognized by the United States, such as the Commission of the European 
Communities. Since they perform the essential functions of diplomatic missions they receive 
the same kind of treatment. 
Additionally, several statutes or agreements require the granting of diplomatic immunities 
to personnel of various organizations similar to diplomatic missions that are accredited to 
the United States. The Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, 
Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, T.I.A.S. No. 6900, and the provision extending certain im-
munities to representatives of member states of the Council of the Organization of American 
States (OAS), 22 U.S.C. § 288(g) (1976), read in conjunction with the Diplomatic Relations 
Act, make it clear that United Nations and OAS delegations are considered part of the dip-
lomatic community and are entitled to immunity under the Vienna Convention. 
72 During the hearings on the DRA, Evan V. Dubelle, Chief of Protocol, Department of 
State, criticized the 1790 statute for its failure to reflect the functional approach: "[T]here is 
a clear need to limit the application of diplomatic immunity to the purpose for which it has 
historically been intended, namely, to ensure the legitimate, unimpaired conduct of official 
relations bet wen a diplomatic mission as representative of the sending country and the host 
country .... " Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 62. 
73 Id. at 6. 
74 See notes 46-58 and accompanying text supra. 
102 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:l 
Thus, passage of the DRA offers a deterrent to these members of 
the diplomatic community from engaging in criminal actions. As 
the DRA ends civil immunity for a large number of lower echelon 
embassy officials and their families, efforts could be made to trans-
fer parking violations from the local criminal codes to the civil 
code, as has been done in New York. 75 Jurisdiction would thereby 
be established over a great portion of the diplomatic community, 
providing a solution to problems of unpaid parking tickets. 76 
B. Requirement of Liability Insurance 
Under former diplomatic immunity law no adequate mechanism 
existed to compensate individuals injured by the negligent use of 
automobiles or by other tortious actions committed by diplomatic 
personnel. Although repeal ·of the 1790 statute exposes significant 
numbers of diplomatic personnel to civil liability, there are still 
many diplomats and their families who are completely immune 
from civil or criminal proceedings. Thus, an American citizen who 
is injured by the negligent action of an individual enjoying diplomat-
ic immunity, would still be unable to bring suit to collect damages 
under the DRA. 
In 1976, Congress took a step toward remedying this problem by 
enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 77 The Act 
allows recovery against foreign nations for most tortious acts 
committed by their officials and employees while acting within the 
75 See H.R. REP. No. 526, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977); S. REP. No. 958, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 4 (1978). · 
78 During the hearings prior to passage of the DRA in the House of Representatives some 
Congressmen suggested that various municipalities be compensated by the federal govern-
ment for revenue lost as a result of unpaid parking tickets of the diplomatic community. 
Congressman Solarz expressed his support for such a provision: 
P-arking violations involve problems of safety, of unpaid bills to jurisdictions that 
badly need the money, of police time spent making out such tickets, and of inter-
ference with the conduct of local business. If the United States picks up the cost of 
hosting visiting foreign dignitaries, as it often does, I believe that making restitution 
for diplomatic parking tickets should likewise be considered a cost of foreign policy 
that the federal government should bear. At a minimum, the adoption of this provi-
sion will force the State Department to be more vigilant in the effort to force foreign 
diplomats to pay up. 
Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 49. 
Although the DRA eliminates diplomatic immunity in civil cases for two-thirds of the 
foreign diplomats in this country, the compensation fund approach would provide a 
mechanism for reimbursing municipalities for the remaining damage done by those dip-
lomats retaining comprehensive immunity. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra. 
However, such a provision was not included in the bill ultimately passed by the Congress. 
77 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976). For legislative history and purpose of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, see [1976] U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6604. 
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scope of their duties, 78 and it permits execution against any insur-
ance policy held by the foreign nation covering such accidents. 79 
While this measure provides some remedy for American citizens it 
.does not guarantee compensation, because a foreign nation is not 
required under the FSIA to have or obtain insurance. Moreover, 
the FSIA does not cover situations where the injurious acts are 
committed outside the scope of the agent's or employee's duties or 
during the exercise of a discretionary function. 
The DRA attempts to fill a portion of this gap by requiring mem-
bers of the diplomatic community to carry liability insurance. 80 
Specifically, the DRA requires liability insurance to cover risks 
arising from the operation of any motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft 
in the United States. 81 This requirement is applicable to members 
of missions, their families, and the missions themselves. The adop-
tion of this requirement makes United States law similar to most 
European countries, which require that members of the diplomatic 
community possess auto insurance as a condition of entry into the 
country. 82 
Under the DRA, the President is required to establish regula-
tions to specify liability insurance requirements. 83 To guarantee 
compliance with these requirements, the President is authorized to 
"take such steps as he may deem necessary to insure that each 
mission, members of the mission and their families ... comply with 
the requirements established. " 84 
Various approaches could be taken by the State Department, 
acting on behalf of the President, to enforce the compulsory insur-
ance requirement. For example, the approach utilized in European 
countries could be employed, whereby a diplomat must show evi-
dence of insurance before he is issued a license plate for his car or 
registration for his aircraft or vessel.85 If a person seeking diplomat-
ic status failed to comply with the insurance requirement, the De-
partment of State could invoke such administrative actions as per-
sona non grata proceedings, requiring the individual to leave the 
78 28 U.S.C. § Hi05(a)(5) (1976). 
79 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(5) (1976). Subject to existing international agreements, 28 
U.S.C. § 1609 (1976) provides generally that the property in the United States of a foreign 
state shall be immune from attachment, arrest, and execution. The provision reflects the 
traditional view in the United States that the property of foreign states is absolutely immune 
from execution. See Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jamvagsstryelsen, 43 F.2d 705 (2d 
Cir. 1930); Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Banlt, 21 Misc. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469,473 
(1959). However, 28 U .S.C. §§ 1610, 1611 ( 1976) modify this rule and set forth various excep-
tions to this immunity from attachment and execution. 
•
0 Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 6, 92 Stat. 809 (1978). 
8
' Id. 
82 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 15. 
83 Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 6, 92 Stat. 809 (1978). 
•• Id. 
85 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 120. However, the Act 
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country. 86 Alternatively, compliance with the insurance require-
ment could be checked at the point of accreditation or acceptance, 
when the official status of various diplomatic personnel is recog-
nized by the United States. 87 This last approach is undoubtedly 
preferable; it ensures that all diplomatic personnel entering the 
country will comply with the insurance requirement, yet it avoids 
the extreme action of persona non grata proceedings. However, 
the persona non grata approach could be employed where dip-
lomats obtain insurance only to enter the country and subsequently 
allow their policies to lapse. 
With the DRA ensuring that all missions possess motor vehicle, 
vessel, or aircraft liability insurance, the FSIA can become an ef-
fective measure allowing a person iajured by certain tortious acts 
to sue the foreign state directly and execute on the insurance which 
it is required to carry. Thus, when diplomatic personnel inflict tor-
tious injures with an auto while acting within the scope of their of-
ficial duties, liability can be imposed upon the foreign state itself. 88 
Repeal of the 1790 statute and adoption of the DRA subjects lower 
echelon officials to legal process in all civil matters. 89 Con-
sequently, the compulsory insurance requirement 9f the DRA can 
ensure that Americans injured by the tortious acts of such officials 
committed while driving will receive adequate compensation re-
gardless of whether the officials were acting within the scope of 
their duties. However, if a senior diplomat, retaining comprehen-
sive civil and criminal immunity but possessing liability insurance, 
tortiously injuries an American citizen in an auto accident while 
engaged in his private affairs, the victim is precluded from suing 
and attaining redress because of the diplomat's civil immunity.90 
Additionally, because the insurance company is subrogated to all · 
the rights of the insured diplomat, the company could plead dip-
lomatic immunity as a defense if sued directly .91 Thus, compulsory 
auto liability insurance in this situation would not provide a com-
specifies that the insurance must cover operation of motor vehicles and not merely their 
ownership, so that this approach would be incomplete. 
86 See text at note 31 supra. 
81 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 129. The Department 
of State can attach conditions to the acceptance of diplomatic personnel into this country, so 
long as the conditions do not unduly interfere with the efficient functioning of the mission. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 74, 
Comment bat 235 (1965). 
88 28 U.S.C. § l(i()5 (1976). See also [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 6619-20. 
89 Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 3, 92 Stat. 808 (1978). 
90 As indicated above, senior diplomats retain their complete civil and criminal immunity 
under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Privileges, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31, 23 U.S.T. 
3227, 3240, T.I.A.S. No. 7502. See note 50 and accompanying text supra. 
91 It is well recognized that the insurer can take nothing by subrogation but the rights of 
the insured. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 175 U.S. 91 
(1899); Wager v. Providence Ins. Co., 150 U.S. 99 (1893). 
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prehensive solution, since injured parties cannot successfully sue 
senior diplomats in order to obtain compensation. The DRA 
reaches an adequate solution to this problem by avoiding the com-
mon law rule requiring a negligently injured party to assert a dam-
age claim against the tortfeasor personally .92 The measure pro-
vides for direct enforcement of the policy against the insurer in the 
federal courts when the insured diplomat enjoys immunity from 
suit.93 Such an approach is presently being utilized by a number of 
European countries.94 Similar direct actions against insurers are 
utilized by numerous states95 and such actions have been upheld 
by the Supreme Court.96 
Since a direct cause of action against insurers of diplomats is 
based on the DRA, it is available even in those jurisdictions where 
state law does not create a direct cause of action against insurers. 
This is significant, as none of the jurisdictions in which the problem 
of traffic accidents caused by foreign diplomats is most pro-
nounced (District of Columbia, Maryland, New York, and Vir-
ginia) has a direct action statute. 
The DRA prevents the insurer from asserting the diplomatic im-
munity of the insured as a defense against any claim covered by the 
policy. 97 Additionally, the DRA prohibits the defense that the in-
sured diplomat is an indispensable party and prohibits the insurer 
from asserting a defense based on breach of contract in certain cir-
cumstances. 98 The principal purpose of the direct action statute, to 
establish the superiority of the rights of the injured over the rights 
of the insurer or insured, would be emasculated if technical de-
fenses were allowed. Thus, a claimant under a direct action statute 
asserts an independent right and does not claim as a successor in 
interest of either party to the original contract of insurance. 
By permitting direct suit against the fosurer, the measure avoids 
the necessity of initiating legal proceedings against diplomats, thus 
respecting their personal inviolability. The direct action device is 
necessary to complete the statutory framework to enable the citi-
92 Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 7, 92 Stat. 809 (1978). 
93 /d. 
94 The European Convention on Compulsory Insurance Against Civil Liability in Respect 
of Motor Vehicles of April 20, 1959, 720 U.N.T.S. ll9 (1970), is in force in many European 
countries. This multilateral convention requires each signatory state to enact domestic legis-
lation providing for mandatory insurance and a right in the injured party to proceed directly 
against insurers. 
95 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 102. See also 12 G. 
CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW§ 45:816 (2d ed. 1964). 
96 Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). In this case a 
unanimous Supreme Court upheld the Louisiana direct action statute. 
97 Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 7, 92 Stat. 809 (1978). 
98 /d. 
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zens of the United States to obtain redress in the courts against of-
ficials of foreign states.99 
A particular weakness of the ORA is that it does not provide for 
the compensation of injury resulting from torts or abuses of dip-
lomatic immunity other than those involving use of motor vehicles, 
aircraft, or vessels. In the House hearings held prior to passage of 
the ORA, a proposal was considered which might have remedied 
this deficiency.100 This proposal involved the establishment of an 
insurance fund financed by the federal government to compensate 
personal injury or financial loss occasioned by the actions of 
foreign officials protected by diplomatic immunity. The measure 
would have created a Bureau of Claims within the Department of 
State to award compensation in such cases. 
The rationale suggested for such a federally financed insurance 
fund was that the federal government, by granting diplomatic im-
munity as a matter of national policy, has an obligation to compen-
sate its citizens injured as a result of that policy. However, this ap-
proach met resistance in the hearings and was not included in the 
final bill reported out of committee. The Department of Justice ad-
vocated compulsory insurance coverage coupled with the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act as the best approach101 and opposed the 
creation of a fund, indicating that there was no precedent for such a 
measure in Anglo-American civil, or international law. 102 Compul-
sory insurance avoids the need for new administrative machinery 
for the handling of tort claims and imposes the obligation to satisfy 
tort claims on the tortfeasor, not on the American public. Addi-
tionally, the financed insurance fund would provide little incentive 
for the foreign diplomat to exercise care, since a negligent official 
would not be required to compensate his victim. 103 
99 It should be pointed out that the direct action device creates problems for the insurance 
industry. After the ORA becomes law, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations gov-
erns diplomatic immunity in the United States. Pursuant to Article 31 of the Vienna Conven-
tion, no diplomatic agent can be obliged to give evidence as a witness. Accordingly, the dip-
lomat would be free to refuse to cooperate in the defense of the action by the insurer. 
Further, the standard cooperation clause in automobile liability policies could be ignored by 
the diplomat. The diplomat could even neglect to report the accident to the insurance com-
pany in contravention of the standard insurance contract. 
100 See H.R. 7309, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (establishes within the Department of State 
a Bureau of Claims Against Foreign Diplomats with responsibility for awarding full and just 
compensation to persons injured by foreign diplomats and for reimbursing local govern-
ments for revenues lost because of their liability to collect parking fines from foreign dip-
lomats). 
101 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 94-95. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 87. 
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C. Authority to Extend More Favorable or Less Favorable Treat-
ment to Members of Diplomatic Missions 
The United States acted cautiously in reforming the law of dip-
lomatic immunity because it has sizeable diplomatic missions 
throughout the world. Diplomatic immunity is an area in which 
governments are expected to reciprocate in the extension of im-
munities, and a quid pro quo may be granted or inflicted. Thus, 
overly restrictive limitations on diplomatic immunity in the United 
States might result in a reciprocal loss in the broad immunity en-
joyed by United States diplomatic agents in some countries. 
Numerous attempts in Congress have been made to restrict dip-
lomatic immunities more severely than does the DRA. 104 All these 
efforts failed, in part, because Congress likely felt it would be un-
wise to radically narrow immunities, since such action could result 
in unfavorable repercussions for the United States personnel abroad. 
As a consequence, United States law remained fundamentally un-
changed since 1790. -
Passage of the DRA, making the Vienna Convention the sole 
basis of diplomatic immunity in the United States, brings United 
States law into line with that of most other countries. Accordingly, 
the repercussions for United States diplomatic personnel abroad 
will not be as significant as would result from the adoption of more 
restrictive limitations. Moreover, the DRA gives the President the 
authority to extend or circumscribe the immunities of various dip-
lomatic missions on a reciprocal basis. 105 Such a provision is 
necessary in part because many governments may accord Ameri-
can diplomats greater immunity from local jurisdiction than is re-
quired by the Vienna Convention. In order to retain this greater 
degree of immunity, the United States must have the flexibility to 
provide a reciprocal degree of immunity to foreign diplomats in this 
country. Moreover, greater protection must be provided for 
foreign diplomats from non-democratic countries that are not sig-
natories to the Vienna Convention to ensure protection of United 
10
• See H.R. 8, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1925) (to provide relief for the state of New York); 
S. 3964, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) (to amend the traffic laws of Washington, D.C., eliminat-
ing immunity for violations of such laws connected with foreign legations); H.R. 3977, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) (to abolish diplomatic immunity); H.R. 10988, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1956) (to establish United States liability for injuries to persons and property caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act of an individual granted diplomatic immunity by the United 
States). 
105 Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 4, 92 Stat. 809 (1978) provides: 
The President may, on the basis of reciprocity and under such terms as he may 
determine, specify privileges and immunities for members of the mission, their 
families, and the diplomatic couriers of any sending state which result in more 
favorable treatment or less favorable treatment than is provided under the Vienna 
Convention. 
108 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 12:l 
States diplomatic personnel from harassment and arbitrary applica-
tion of local law. 106 In the Soviet Union, for example, United 
States diplomatic personnel are accorded full diplomatic immunity 
which is broader than the immunity provided in the Convention. 
According to the Vienna Convention, the Soviet Union can restrict 
such immunities on a reciprical basis if immunities of Soviet per-
sonnel in the United States are similarly restricted.107 As the Presi-
dent is granted authority to extend greater immunity than that re-
quired by the Vienna Convention, this situation can be re-
medied.108 
Permitting less favorable treatment than the Convention pro-
vides is also necessary to secure protection of United States dip-
lomats abroad. Where certain nations restrict the immunities of 
United States diplomatic personnel, similar action may be taken by 
the President. Although the ORA specifically states that the provi-
sions of the Vienna Convention shall apply to nonratifying na-
tions, 109 thus expressing the intent that provisions of the Conven-
tion be applied uniformly to all nations, some flexibility is needed. 
Although administering different standards for various countries 
might prove difficult and possibly result in discriminatory and arbi-
trary applications, it is clear that the need to ensure proper protec-
tion of diplomatic personnel abroad requires presidential discretion 
in this area. 
D. Dismissal of Action Against Individuals Entitled to Immunity 
The 1790 statute provided that the institution of an action against 
a diplomat would be deemed void .110 The operation of this provi-
sion was unclear: a diplomat might have assumed that he must 
notify the Department of State, appear in court to present his de-
fense, or simply do nothing. Appearing in court and presenting a 
defense on the merits could have proved detrimental to the dip-
lomat, as in at least one case such action was deemed a waiver of 
diplomatic immunity. 111 The ORA clarifies the procedure for as-
serting the diplomatic immunity. 
The DRA provides a specific mechanism for dismissal of actions 
by a judicial tribunal or administrative agency where diplomatic 
immunity is found.11 2 Although the diplomat has an absolute legal 
10• H.R. REP. No. 526, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977); S. REP. No. 958, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 5 (1978). · 
101 See note 62 supra. 
108 Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Hearings, supra note 2, at 215-16. 
10• Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 3, 92 Stat. 808 (1978). 
110 22 U.S.C. § 252 (1976) (repealed 1978). 
111 Herman v. Apetz, 130 Misc. 618,224 N.Y.S. 389 (1927). 
11 • Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 5, 92 Stat. 809 (1978). 
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defense if suit is brought under circumstances not sanctioned by 
the Vienna Convention, it is the responsibility of the diplomat to 
assert that defense affirmatively, as permitted by law or applicable 
rules of procedure, to avoid a default judgment.113 Thus, the bur-
den is appropriately placed on the diplomatic community to seek 
dismissal of an action. It is the role of the Department of State sim-
ply to verify the status of each individual and not to stand as rep-
resentative for the diplomatic community .114 
Unlike the 1790 statute, the ORA does not subject any person 
who obtains or executes a writ or process against a diplomatic 
agent to fine or imprisonment. 115 Such a harsh approach, disre-
garding intent or knowledge of diplomatic status, is apparently not 
deemed necessary to prevent interference with the diplomatic 
function. 
E. Amending the Judiciary Code 
Under past law, the Supreme Court had original and exclusive 
jurisdiction in "all actions or proceedings against ambassadors or 
other public ministers of foreign states or their domestic ser-
vants. " 116 The ORA extends the jurisdiction of federal district 
courts to encompass such actions.11 7 The Supreme Court retains 
original jurisdiction, as required by article III, section 2 of the Con-
stitution, 118 but the Act largely removes the burden of such litiga-
tion from the Court's docket. 119 
Federal district courts formerly had original jurisdiction, exclu-
sive of state courts, over "all actions and proceedings against con-
suls or vice consuls of foreign states. " 120 The ORA extends the 
jurisdiction of the district courts to suits involving members of a 
mission or members of their families. 121 Thus, this amendment 
11• Id. 
11 • H.R. REP. No. 526, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977). See also S. REP. No. 958, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978). 
115 See 22 U .S.C. § 253 (1976) (repealed 1978). However, few if any cases imposed fines or 
imprisonment for the violation of this statute. 
11 • 28 U.S.C. § 125l(a)(2) (1976) (amended 1978). 
11 7 It has long been established that the Congress may not deny to the Supreme Court 
jurisdiction which is expressly granted to it by the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
(l Cranch) 137 (1803). However, from the time of the Judiciary Act of 1789, inferior federal 
courts have been given concurrent jurisdiction over certain cases of which the Supreme 
Court has original jurisdiction, and such legislation has been consistently upheld. United 
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936); Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449 (1884); Bors v. Pre-
ston, lll U.S. 252 (1884). 
118 U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 2 in part provides that "[i]n all cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls ... the Supreme Court shall have the original jurisdic-
tion." 
11 • H.R. REP. No. 526, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1970). 
1 zo 28 U .S.C. § 1351 (1976) (amended 1978). 
121 Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 8, 92 Stat. 810 (1978). 
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provides a district court forum for suits against diplomatic person-
nel in all cases where such suits would be allowed under the DRA 
and the Vienna Convention. Additionally, the term "all actions and 
proceedings" appearing in the Code is qualified by the word 
''civil'' which clarifies the jurisdiction of the federal district courts 
and removes the prohibition on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction 
by state courts;122 The DRA thereby makes it clear that the state 
courts are not denied jurisdiction to enforce the criminal laws of 
the states against members of a mission and their families under 
circumstances where existing laws do not provide immunity from 
the criminal jurisdiction of the United States.123 
V. CONCLUSION 
The United States has taken a significant step toward moderniz-
ing its antiquated laws with respect to diplomatic immunity. This 
legislation will have the salutory effect of replacing the absolute 
immunity conferred upon all diplomatic personnel regardless of 
rank or function, with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, thus making the degree of immunity some-
what commensurate with the foreign representative's rank and re-
sponsibilities. Accordingly, considerable numbers of lower eche-
lon embassy personnel will be held responsible for their wrongful 
conduct that injures American citizens or ignores local law. 
While repeal of the 1790 statute restricts the scope of immunity 
conferred, it will not provide protection for an aggrieved victim of a 
tortious action or broken contract involving members of the dip-
lomatic community in all circumstances. The DRA attempts to 
provide some measure of redress for Americans injured in certain 
accidents by requiring the members of the diplomatic community 
accredited to the United States to maintain motor vehicle, aircraft, 
and vessel insurance. This insurance provision becomes an effec-
tive tool through the mechanism for direct enforcement of the pol-
icy against the insurer. However, while liability insurance may 
ease some of the problems, particularly involving automobiles, it 
does not provide compensation damages due to other types of tor-
tious acts committed by diplomats. 
The Act provides for some necessary flexibility in the scope of 
immunity, for it empowers the President to extend on a reciprocal 
basis more or less favorable treatment than is required by 
the Vienna Convention. In countries where due process is unavail-
able and American diplomats need protection from the biases of 
122 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1976) (amended 1978). 
123 Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, § 8, 92 Stat. 810 (1978). 
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local law, the President should have discretionary authority to 
negotiate with such countries. The Act also confers upon the fed-
eral district courts concurrentjurisdiction with the Supreme Court 
to decide suits brought against key diplomatic personnel. 
It is clear that the laws of the United States relating to diplomatic 
immunity were in need of amendment to bring them into line with 
the Vienna Convention and current international practice. The 
enactment of the DRA helps to assure meaningful results in this 
long-ignored, vital area. 
-Paul F. Roye 
